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Abstract
It is the contention of this special issue that regionalisation, in the sense of focusing
important aspects of governance on the scale of marine eco-regions, can make a
valuable contribution to the reform of the European Union’s Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP). Despite recent trials and tribulations associated with the current reforms,
we remain firmly convinced of the merits of reforming the CFP around a process of
devolving detailed, technical decision-making to some form of collective
organisation of member states working together at the level of the regional sea. We
remain hopeful that something more substantive will prevail by the end of 2012,
perhaps in the form of non-statutory regional governance structures capable of
implementing Community policy in a regionally sensitive and practical way. Though
we believe that regional management is inevitable if the CFP is eventually to deliver
sustainable fisheries, we acknowledge that in reality regionalising the CFP was always
likely to proceed incrementally.Review
It is the contention of this special issue that regionalisation, in the sense of focusing
important aspects of governance on the scale of marine eco-regions, can make a valu-
able contribution to the reform of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP). We believe that the arguments supporting this judgement have been substan-
tiated in the preceding papers. Regionalisation can deliver two significant, if not indis-
pensable, elements of setting the CFP on a sustainable course: the ‘moving down’ and
‘moving out’ of authority for fisheries management (Raakjær and Hegland 2012). In the
context of regionalisation, ‘moving down’ refers to relieving the central EU institutions
of certain management responsibilities and allowing lower level authorities to assume
them. ‘Moving out’ implies increasing the involvement of stakeholders in the manage-
ment process by transferring some areas of authorisation the public sector to public-
private cooperative institutions or to the fisheries sector itself.
On their own, these elements do little to bring the CFP onto a more sustainable
track. As Symes (2012) argues, regionalisation has to be seen as a vehicle for funda-
mental reform and not as an end in itself. Detailed proposals for a discard ban, cur-
rently under consideration by the European Commission, clearly lend themselves to
regional deliberation and action. Unfortunately, the Commission’s recently published
proposals for reforming the CFP (Commission 2011a) would fail to commit member
states to cooperation at the regional sea level on such issues.
In the concluding sections of his paper, Symes (2012) describes regionalisation of the
CFP as a work in progress. The Commission’s unambitious proposals for a new basic2012 Raakjaer et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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The case for regionalisation is seen as a logical outcome of the enlargement of the EU
that has rendered decision-making both impractical and ineffective. Flexibility in
addressing the problems is presently inhibited by the rigidity of the current decision-
making system induced by the exclusive competence granted to EU institutions in deal-
ing with fisheries management. The Commission’s Directorate-General for Maritime
Affairs (DG MARE) has been unable to translate its ambitious agenda for a redistribu-
tion of decision-making responsibilities into substantive proposals in the new draft
regulation. This owes more to an interest (possibly supported by a constitutional im-
perative) to safeguard the integrity of the EU’s political structures and the authority of
the Commission in particular than to the exposure of flaws in the argument for
regionalisation.
The purpose of the concluding remarks is not simply to summarise the findings from
the foregoing papers but rather to try and elicit how these findings might inform
present and future debates on reform of the CFP in general and the issue of regionalisa-
tion in particular. To do this we first reiterate why regionalisation forms such a key
element in the structure of CFP governance and the relative merits of models for re-
gionalisation discussed in this and earlier issues. We will then attempt to sketch out al-
ternative answers to the question: what will the future bring for regionalisation? Does
the current situation lead us to conclude that the case for regionalisation has been
abandoned or postponed to a later date? Or is there still reason to believe that regional-
isation might still lie at the heart of the 2012 reforms?Why regionalisation?
The case for regionalisation is strong. Regionalised governance brings the scale of gov-
ernance in line with the scale of most underlying physico-socio-biological phenomena
and processes with which governance is interacting. It has the potential to contribute
to the multiple objectives of CFP governance in relation to generic concerns for effi-
ciency and legitimacy and to more targeted measures for dealing with regional specific
fisheries. The advantages of regionalisation extend beyond the fisheries domain, enab-
ling better integration of the different policies relating to the regional seas. Each of
these benefits needs to be carried forward into the final stages of the political debate on
reforming the CFP.Improved legitimacy and efficiency
The evidence presented by Hegland et al. (2012b) demonstrates that regionalisation is
useful in increasing the legitimacy of CFP governance. It facilitates a move towards
more genuine mechanisms for co-management within the CFP and thereby provides
for stronger involvement of stakeholders (‘process legitimacy’). Enhanced stakeholder
involvement should, in turn, lead to increasingly effective, tailor-made measures more
closely aligned to the problems experienced (‘content legitimacy’). Regionalisation is
also perceived as helping to make governance more efficient. The CFP has long been
suffering from excessive centralisation. EU central institutions have become overbur-
dened with detailed issues (such as mesh sizes for specific fisheries) that more appro-
priate could be dealt with at the regional level. This problem could become even more
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of the European Parliament in co-decision making in fisheries policy.Avoiding micro-management
The key function of regionalisation is to allow member states, working together, to
shoulder the burden of micro-management by translating the principles, objectives,
standards and targets of a common policy into specific management plans tailored to
the ecological circumstances of the regional sea and adapted to the economic, social
and cultural conditions of the fishing industries that exploit its waters. Responsibility
for detailed actions is delegated to member states acting in concert through a clearly
defined mechanism and a mutually agreed plan. This will enable the much criticised
‘one size fits all’ legislative framework at EU level, and often adjusted to a lowest com-
mon denominator, to be replaced by a system of informed decision-making very much
closer to the specific problems, involving only those member states with a direct in-
volvement in specific fisheries to take appropriate measures for the fulfilment of the
common policy.Fostering responsibility and accountability
A significant problem with the CFP is its failure to foster responsible behaviour by en-
suring accountability. Raakjaer (2009) reminds us that no clear division can be made
between political decisions and administrative implementation. Political decisions can
be redefined and alternative aims pursued at the level of what should, in principle, be
neutral administrative implementation. Gezelius et al. (2008) revealed how compliance
with EU regulations becomes distorted through ‘implementation drift’ whereby political
decisions made in Brussels are redefined at member state level. More specifically, Heg-
land and Raakjaer (2008) show how problems originate in the failure of the present
two-tier political system in the EU to create incentives for responsible behaviour in
shared fisheries because of a lack of accountability.
A key question is therefore whether collaboration between neighbouring member
states and their fishing industries can provide sufficient incentives for the emergence of
a ‘culture of compliance’ both within member states’ administrations and across the
fishing industry. Does the introduction of a third, intermediary level of governance in-
crease the risk of ‘implementation drift’ – or can this be overcome by careful attention
to institutional design? If the latter is true, regionalisation should ensure that those re-
sponsible for making the decisions are held accountable or, at the very least, can be
readily identified.Facilitating integration with environmental policy
Moving beyond the narrow domain of fisheries management, van Hoof et al. (2012) in-
dicate how the integration of fisheries within a broader management context presents a
major challenge. In comparison with several other areas of marine/maritime policy, the
CFP currently scores low on regionalisation as a basis for further integration.
The shift towards ecosystem based management and more holistic management of
multiple sectors is seen as a driver for regionalising the CFP. It increases the potential
for integrating policies across all sectors and activities at the scale of the marine
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distinct trajectories: one, haltingly, under the CFP and the other under the Marine
Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). To date, there has been little or no convergence
in how regionalisation and integration are perceived in the two policy areas, because
their development has been steered by separate Directorates-General within the Com-
mission, respectively DG MARE and DG Environment. The fact that each policy is
characterised by different institutional settings, stakeholder dynamics and power rela-
tions necessarily complicates the situation. Integrating the two policies would clearly be
facilitated by regionalising the CFP so as to give marine ecosystems a more central pos-
ition in relation to governance. Integration would also be facilitated if national compe-
tence within the MSFD was to be regionalised through cooperation between the
relevant coastal states with competence within a marine eco-region. Hegland et al.
(2012b) endorse this line of argument, suggesting that regionalisation is both a way to
manage ecosystems and fishing fleets in accordance with regional needs and a means
of securing greater policy integration.
Regionalisation has, in this special issue, mainly been discussed in contrast to centra-
lised governance. There have however been voices in the debate about the CFP reform,
which have argued for renationalisation of the fisheries policy. The reasons for regiona-
lised governance being a preferable solution vis-à-vis nationalised solution have not
been discussed here. The main argument against renationalisation of the fisheries policy
– and of national management of many aspects of marine and maritime issues - is that
important underlying physico-socio-biological processes operate at the scale of marine
ecosystems and cannot be managed on a national scale in the first place whenever these
ecosystems are shared across exclusive economic zones.How to regionalise
A common thread running throughout the presentations that make up this special
issue is the importance of creating an appropriate, well defined and explicit framework
for regionalisation. Significantly, the Commission (2009, 2011a, b) leaves the architec-
tural design of regionalisation very much to the reader’s imagination. By contrast, sev-
eral of the papers in this volume attempt to sketch the outlines of plausible, alternative
models. They are no more than skeletal designs but sufficient to clarify some of the key
issues. The question is which of these designs is best able to satisfy the conflicting
demands of legal, political and management scrutiny.
For Symes (2012) the choice is between what he describes as a de minimis adminis-
trative model based on “a regional standing conference of member state administra-
tions” meeting at regular intervals to interpret and implement Community policy,
heavily reliant on advice from the Regional Advisory Council (RAC), or a dedicated
“regional management organisation” with broad stakeholder membership and an inde-
pendent secretariat. His preference for the former is based purely on pragmatic
grounds of simplicity, cost and the fact that it enshrines the principle of delegating au-
thority to member states. It, therefore, does not conjure up a separate entity that chal-
lenges the authority of either the European institutions or the member states.
Hegland et al. (2012a, b) present a more nuanced range of options that overlap
Symes’ basic choices but are differentiated on the basis of their structures, membership,
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where the EU sets the principles, objectives and targets of the Community policy, the
regional institutions devise specific plans for managing the fisheries accordingly and
the member states are responsible for implementation through regulation of their own
fishing activities. When subjected to scrutiny by RAC members with experience in, and
a predisposition towards regional management, the balance of opinion favoured the
more ambitious solutions (Regional Fisheries Management Organisation and Regional
Fisheries Co-Management Organisation) rather than the simpler, pragmatic option (Co-
operative Member State Council) overlapping with Symes’ (Symes 2012) regional stand-
ing conference of member states. There was little support for either the status quo or a
renationalisation of fisheries management that places the individual member state at
the centre of the system.
Ounanian and Hegland’s (2012) analysis of the achievement of RACs prompts a third
approach to regionalisation. Demonstrating the value that RACs have already shown in
facilitating information sharing, cultivating stakeholder relationships and providing evi-
dence based advice. They argue that RACs have already proved their competence in
developing a regional approach to fisheries management. The future for RACs is seen
to be reaching a critical juncture. The Commission now needs to place more confi-
dence in the RACs’ advisory role through enhanced uptake of the advice received
(Coers et al. 2012) if it is to avoid alienating RAC members who devote time, effort and
expertise to generating well considered, sound scientific advice. The Commission could
go further by promoting RACs as platforms for closer integration with other areas of
marine policy. For some, RACs provide the essential building block for the new re-
gional management bodies, though this is not a widely held view within the RACs
themselves. Should regionalisation be given the green light, RACs would be assured of
a continuing significant role, serving possibly more appreciative clients.
The question still remains: which of the various approaches outlined in the preceding
papers offers the best solution? This is possibly the most crucial challenge for the re-
gionalisation project, not only intellectually but also politically and legally. The creation
of an ‘intervening’ organisation – even one with limited authority – is seen to pose a
threat to the competences of the EU institutions and the member states. Yet without
such an organisation to manage the process of collective decision-making at the level
of the regional sea, effective regional management is not possible. In an ideal world,
one would naturally strive for an institutional form that meets the criteria of strong
stakeholder representation, interactive governance, transparency and accountability.
But in the real world of legal constraints and political realities, it might be necessary to
adopt a more pragmatic approach, opting for a simpler administrative model and hop-
ing to generate greater synergies with a revitalised RAC in order to deliver the full ben-
efits of regionalisation.What will the future bring for regionalisation?
2012 will conclude another round of reform of the CFP; and for the first time decisions
will be made jointly by the Parliament and Council of Ministers. At the start of 2012
there are limited grounds for optimism concerning regionalisation of the CFP. The
Commission’s proposals for reform (Commission 2011a) are devoid of commitment to
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with marine eco-regions at its core.
It is difficult to see how the Commission’s proposals advance the process of regiona-
lising the CFP and it is possible to interpret the Commission’s rhetoric in its Communi-
cation (Commission 2011b) as a less than convincing cover up for its failure to deliver
even the quite modest expectations built up in its earlier Green Paper (Commission
2009). Legal challenges to the notion of regionalisation have frequently been cited as
the reason for this failure. There is, however, room for interpretation over the implica-
tions of the European Treaties in this matter and a tension is discernible between DG
MARE’s interpretation of what can be done to improve fisheries management and the
Commission’s Legal Services’ assertion of what should be done in the interests of the
EU institutions in general.
The Commission’s proposals are not the end of the story as the Parliament and
Council will now have their say; Parliament, in particular, has previously expressed its
support for regionalisation (European Parliament 2010). Hopefully, the European Par-
liament through the co-decision process can find a more sustainable path for the future
of the CFP. Our fear, however, is that the failure to recognise the advantages of region-
alisation will cast a long shadow over the reform process. An opportunity to remedy
the structural failings of the CFP, clearly identified in the Commission’s 2009 Green
Paper will, as a consequence, be missed. The future of the reform process is uncertain
– the more so because we have no precedent as to the outcomes of the co-decision
process to guide us. We therefore offer four alternative scenarios in relation to the fu-
ture of regionalisation in the context of the CFP.Regionalisation is postponed for yet another decade
A likely outcome of the present round of negotiations for reforming the CFP is that
there will be little, if any, substantive action on regionalisation. The arguments in sup-
port of this contention have already been thoroughly rehearsed (see Symes 2012). To
date, the Commission has been unable to provide a clear exposition of how regionalisa-
tion would work. Instead, it cites the terms of the Lisbon Treaty to explain why it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to elaborate a third level of decision-making between the EU
institutions and the member states – a condition that will also weigh heavily with the
co-decision process. As a result, changes to the decision-making system will at best be
reduced to the delegation of a limited range of powers to member states for the intro-
duction of technical measures in relation to their own vessels. Fundamental reform of
the CFP, promised in the Green Paper, will have to await the next decennial review in
2022.Regionalisation is formally introduced into the CFP’s governance system
A second, but currently less likely, scenario is that the Parliament and Council find a
means of circumventing the legal obstacles and formally adopting regional decision-
making as part of the governance structure. This would require a complete overhaul of
the Commission’s current proposals for reform of the CFP. More importantly, if we are
to believe the arguments put forward by the Commission’s Legal Services, such a rad-
ical change will require amendments to the existing Treaties – a task that few would be
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withstanding the compelling arguments for regionalising fisheries policy, it is unlikely
that the Commission would be willing to entertain a thorough review of its powers in
relation to fisheries conservation – one of the few areas of policy where the EU has ex-
clusive competence – as the new regional institutions may compromise the Commis-
sion’s prerogatives in some way.Regionalisation materialises through informal collaboration
If we pay attention to the Communication from the Commission (2011b) rather than
its proposals for reform of the CFP (2011a), there is reason to believe that the future
for regionalisation may not be quite as bleak as that depicted above. The problem is
how to convert the Commission’s positive assessment into reality when the hardwired
backing for such a change is missing from the basic regulation.
Following publication of the proposals for the new basic regulation (Commission
2011a), many stakeholders – ranging across national administrations, industry organisa-
tions, conservation groups and RACs – have expressed their concern that delegation of
responsibilities and a regionalised approach to fisheries management need to be given
more prominence. DG MARE has reiterated its belief that regionalisation will form a
key element of the reformed CFP and a ‘non-paper’ on regionalisation has been drafted
by the DG MARE. Behind these assertions lurks the suggestion of informal action to
encourage the ‘moving down’ and ‘moving out’ of management decisions, ensuring a
higher level of stakeholder involvement through the creation of partnerships rather
than the consultative arrangements currently in place.
What might emerge is an informal system of regionalisation which we can best con-
ceptualise as a set of non-statutory arrangements built on trust and reciprocity with an
inbuilt hierarchy for transferring responsibilities downwards and outwards and a results
based management approach to hardwire responsibility at the level of the fishing indus-
try. The informal structures will allow member states jointly to ensure that such actions
were compliant with the principles, objectives and targets of Community policy. This
seems a rather insecure route for achieving regional management. If, in the end, all it
means is that collective action is restricted to informal discussions between member
states without de facto transferral of new competences, it is unlikely that the resulting
form of regional management will be able to resolve the basic problems currently faced
by the CFP (Raakjær 2009).Regionalisation through delegation of powers to member states
Despite the widespread preference among stakeholders for formal institutional struc-
tures to support the regionalisation of the CFP, we have recently seen stakeholders ar-
guing for a decentralised management structure with decision-making powers
delegated to member states, advised by RACs with an enhanced mandate and improved
scientific support (van Hoof et al. 2011). This model, based on informal politico-
administrative structures, involves member states with fishing interests in a specific
regional sea establishing a Decentralised Fisheries Management Board with the incorp-
oration of the relevant RAC as a working group within the Board and given observer
status at Board meetings.
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foster a collaborative approach among member states, RACs and scientific institutions
to develop multi-annual plans for the region’s fisheries. It offers a high degree of flexi-
bility within the present legal structures. But it comes at a cost. It would have to rely
on voluntary agreements, soft law and recognition of its de facto ‘authority’ based on
the quality of its inputs and outputs rather than on de jure authority in the implemen-
tation of its recommendations.
This approach and the ‘informal collaboration’ model previously described both suffer
the disadvantage that they leave the member states to bear the additional financial costs
– modest though these may bea – for what could be very little return. In the present
economic climate, some member states may be reluctant to support the initiative for
short-term budgetary considerations. It may be possible to seek financial support from
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) whose programme for 2014-20 is
currently under discussion. An application for funding would be greatly strengthened if
it were linked to proposals for closer integration with other areas of regionalised mar-
ine/maritime policy and preparation for marine spatial planning at regional and sub-
regional levels. The fishing industry’s level of preparedness for marine spatial planning
presently lags behind that of the more powerful shipping, oil and gas and offshore en-
ergy interests (Ounanian et al. 2012).Conclusion
This special issue represents the synthesis of several strands of research on regionalisa-
tion – in some instances developed over a decade or more and in others the result of
more recent analyses of ecosystem based management and the present and future roles
of RACs – in an attempt to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the com-
plexities surrounding regionalisation of the CFP. Despite recent trials and tribulations
associated with the current reforms, we remain firmly convinced of the merits of
reforming the CFP around a process of devolving detailed, technical decision making to
some form of collective organisation of member states working together at the level of
the regional sea. DG MARE seemed to be of a similar mind when setting out its
thoughts in the 2009 Green Paper. However, this line of thinking has been overruled by
other forces at work within the Commission, which have succeeded in reducing the
ambition for regionalisation of the CFP, as set out in the draft regulation, to little more
than a token gesture.
If the regional project remains incomplete at the end of 2012 we will perhaps need to
delve more deeply into the reasons for its failure. A reasoned analysis of the legal con-
straints (we have never been told precisely why the door to regionalisation has
remained firmly shut), further examination of the responses to the Green Paper to
achieve a clearer picture of the differing attitudes to regionalisation, and a close moni-
toring of the co-decision process involving Parliament and Council will all help to
understand the political and legal contexts of CFP reform more fully.
Regionalisation is unlikely to be the only casualty of the 2012 reforms. Several other
issues raised in the Green Paper, including some that featured in DG MARE’s five
structural failings, have failed to survive the reform process so far. It may be necessary
to consider whether the conventions of path dependent change (see Gezelius et al.
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deeply engrained in the CFP that fundamental reform is simply out of the question.
Meanwhile, we remain hopeful that something more substantive will prevail by the
end of 2012, perhaps in the form of non-statutory regional governance structures cap-
able of implementing Community policy in a regionally sensitive and practical way.
Though we believe that regional management is inevitable if the CFP is eventually to
deliver sustainable fisheries, we acknowledge that in reality regionalising the CFP was
always likely to proceed incrementally. The establishment of RACS in 2003 was first
step in the provision of advice, and we hope that 2012 will at least lay the foundations
for implementing Community policy at a regional level to be fully implemented in the
2022 reform.
Fisheries, like all other aspects of marine/maritime development, are best managed at
the regional, ecosystem level. It is difficult to see how the goals of sustainable develop-
ment for the seas around the EU can be achieved without debate, decision-making and
action taking place within a common regional framework.
Endnotes
a These costs could be inflated were the Commission to determine that RACs, origin-
ally established as an instrument of Community policy making, were now acting princi-
pally in the interests of, and at the behest of, the member states rather than the
Commission per se.
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